[PATCH u-boot v2019.04-aspeed-openbmc 1/7] rsa: reject images with unknown padding

[Joel Stanley]

From: Patrick Doyle <wpdster at gmail.com>

Previously we would store NULL in info->padding and jump to an illegal
instruction if an unknown value for "padding" was specified in the
device tree.

Signed-off-by: Patrick Doyle <pdoyle at irobot.com>
(cherry picked from commit 19495dd9b6f5f4e893b56b0c73e14b2e671c3780)
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel at jms.id.au>
---
 common/image-sig.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/common/image-sig.c b/common/image-sig.c
index 4f6b4ec412c3..004fbc525b5c 100644
--- a/common/image-sig.c
+++ b/common/image-sig.c
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static int fit_image_setup_verify(struct image_sign_info *info,
 	info->required_keynode = required_keynode;
 	printf("%s:%s", algo_name, info->keyname);
 
-	if (!info->checksum || !info->crypto) {
+	if (!info->checksum || !info->crypto || !info->padding) {
 		*err_msgp = "Unknown signature algorithm";
 		return -1;
 	}
-- 
2.29.2