BMCWeb: rate-limit authentication failures
Joseph Reynolds
jrey at linux.ibm.com
Wed Feb 5 09:41:12 AEDT 2020
I would like to enhance BMCWeb to rate-limit password-based
authentication attempts (footnote1) to address [CWE-307][]. [Broken
Authentication][] is an OWASP top 10 item. The goal is to protect
against CWE-307 without causing denial of service. Specifically, when
excessive authentication attempts are happening, legitimate users should
be able to access the BMC (specifically an admin can login), and
degraded BMC performance is acceptable.
The main idea for the design is to allow authentication at full speed,
and rate-limit only when needed. This is consistent with the approach
OWASP outlines.
Perhaps the design can be as simple as recording the 10 most recent
authentication failures (steady_clock time only, having them time out
after a minute) to define "excessive", and using the timestamp of the
most recent failure to determine when the next attempt will be allowed.
When authentication is requested but not allowed, return HTTP status
code 429 (Too Many Requests) with HTTP response header "Retry-After:
3". ==> This will slow down attackers (for example, to 30 tries per
minute, even when multiple connections are used) and allow legitimate
users to compete for authentication attempts.
However, I think even this apparently simple design might be tricky to
get right. Is there an open source solution we can use? What do you
think? Let me know if this is important to you. I would like to hear
ideas how to proceed.
- Joseph
<snip/>TL;DR (too long; don't read):
A counterpart to this design is to delay any failed authentication
attempt for a few seconds. This is intended to slow down malfunctioning
network agents that repeatedly fail to authenticate to the BMC. This
won't slow down attackers who can use multiple connections to the BMC.
I looked at using Linux-PAM. For example, [OpenBMC uses pam_tally2][]
but does not configure account lockouts. I don't want to pursue using
the pam_tally2 lockout mechanism because that can lead to denial of
service. I believe rate-limiting is a better approach.
I only want to protect access via BMCWeb. The protection techniques may
also apply to network IPMI and SSH, but the direction is to disable
these accesses, so I am less interested. Access via the BMC's serial
console would not be protected. Access via the BMC's host should have
similar protections, but I am not investigating that now.
CWE-307 is a problem only because OpenBMC offers password-based
authentication without requiring multi-factor authentication (MFA).
Disabling password-based auth remains a popular use case, and OpenBMC
has no MFA capabilities. So I need CWE-307 protection as a stop-gap
solution.
References and footnotes:
[CWE-307]: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/307.html
[OpenBMC uses pam_tally2]:
https://github.com/openbmc/openbmc/blob/master/meta-phosphor/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam.d/common-auth
(footnote1): BMCWeb's password-based authentication includes Basic Auth,
login via /login, and creating a Redfish session. It does not include
authentication via mTLS or using an X-Auth-Token or a cookie from an
established session.
[Broken Authentication]:
https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/OWASP_Top_Ten_2017/Top_10-2017_A2-Broken_Authentication
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