Supporting insecure protocols in RMCP+
vernon.mauery at linux.intel.com
Wed Apr 25 01:34:56 AEST 2018
On 24-Apr-2018 09:17 AM, Brad Bishop wrote:
>> On Apr 23, 2018, at 3:30 PM, Vernon Mauery <vernon.mauery at linux.intel.com> wrote:
>> On 23-Apr-2018 11:47 AM, Vernon Mauery wrote:
>>>> Patch Set 4:
>>>>> Given that RMCP+ is already insecure, unless it is a requirement to support 1, 2, 15, and 16, you may just want to support 3 and 17.
>>>> 1,2,3 are marked as mandatory in the specification. It should be a community decision to revoke support for 1,2. If the community is ok, it will need additional code changes.
>>> tl;dr IPMI is old; let's drop the most insecure parts
>> While I am at it, can we agree
>I agree with all your points. But why is consensus necessary?
Consensus is best when we are intentionally going against the IPMI
standard. With IPMI, there may be several of these things where we might
want to break the standard in order to provide better security. But I
don't think we can do that unilaterally.
>> that anonymous and nameless accounts are dangerous. I know that the IPMI spec says that having an account with no name is mandatory, I think this is another case of security trumps the standard.
>> I would at least like a way to disable this at build time so we CANNOT have this exploited.
>That sounds like a reasonable way to make the code do what you need.
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