[PATCH v2 0/6] x86/uaccess: Avoid barrier_nospec()

[Josh Poimboeuf]

On Thu, Oct 17, 2024 at 11:31:30PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> Even if you can get Intel and AMD to agree that STAC/CLAC are really
> LFENCEs (and I think you'll struggle), they'd only confer the safety you
> want between a real conditional that excludes the non-canonical range,
> and the pointer deference.
> 
> Any path that genuinely deferences a non-canonical pointer is not safe,
> whatever serialisation you put in the way.  The attacker wins the moment
> the load uop executes.
> 
> The final hunk of patch 1 is safe (iff STAC is given extra guarantees)
> because it is between the conditional and the deference.  Patch 4 is not
> safe (if the comment is correct) because it removes the conditional.

So the naming is confusing:

  - put_user()   implementation is __put_user_*()
  - __put_user() implementation is __put_user_nocheck_*()

Patch 4 only affects __put_user(), for which the user is expected to
call access_ok() beforehand.

The current implementations of get_user(), put_user() and
masked_user_access_begin() avoid the conditional.  Those are the ones it
sounds like you're worried about?

None of my patches remove conditional checks.

-- 
Josh