[PATCH v6 3/6] KEYS: trusted: Introduce NXP DCP-backed trusted keys
Jarkko Sakkinen
jarkko at kernel.org
Fri Mar 8 06:30:23 AEDT 2024
On Thu Mar 7, 2024 at 5:38 PM EET, David Gstir wrote:
> DCP (Data Co-Processor) is the little brother of NXP's CAAM IP.
> Beside of accelerated crypto operations, it also offers support for
> hardware-bound keys. Using this feature it is possible to implement a blob
> mechanism similar to what CAAM offers. Unlike on CAAM, constructing and
> parsing the blob has to happen in software (i.e. the kernel).
>
> The software-based blob format used by DCP trusted keys encrypts
> the payload using AES-128-GCM with a freshly generated random key and nonce.
> The random key itself is AES-128-ECB encrypted using the DCP unique
> or OTP key.
>
> The DCP trusted key blob format is:
> /*
> * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format.
> *
> * @fmt_version: Format version, currently being %1
> * @blob_key: Random AES 128 key which is used to encrypt @payload,
> * @blob_key itself is encrypted with OTP or UNIQUE device key in
> * AES-128-ECB mode by DCP.
> * @nonce: Random nonce used for @payload encryption.
> * @payload_len: Length of the plain text @payload.
> * @payload: The payload itself, encrypted using AES-128-GCM and @blob_key,
> * GCM auth tag of size AES_BLOCK_SIZE is attached at the end of it.
> *
> * The total size of a DCP BLOB is sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + @payload_len +
> * AES_BLOCK_SIZE.
> */
> struct dcp_blob_fmt {
> __u8 fmt_version;
> __u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
> __u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
> __le32 payload_len;
> __u8 payload[];
> } __packed;
>
> By default the unique key is used. It is also possible to use the
> OTP key. While the unique key should be unique it is not documented how
> this key is derived. Therefore selection the OTP key is supported as
> well via the use_otp_key module parameter.
>
> Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard at nod.at>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard at nod.at>
> Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer at sigma-star.at>
> Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer at sigma-star.at>
> Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david at sigma-star.at>
> ---
> include/keys/trusted_dcp.h | 11 +
> security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 8 +
> security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 2 +
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 6 +-
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c | 309 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> 5 files changed, 335 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_dcp.h
> create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
>
> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_dcp.h b/include/keys/trusted_dcp.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..9aaa42075b40
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/keys/trusted_dcp.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2021 sigma star gmbh
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef TRUSTED_DCP_H
> +#define TRUSTED_DCP_H
> +
> +extern struct trusted_key_ops dcp_trusted_key_ops;
> +
> +#endif
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
> index 553dc117f385..1fb8aa001995 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
> @@ -39,6 +39,14 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM
> Enable use of NXP's Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module
> (CAAM) as trusted key backend.
>
> +config TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP
> + bool "DCP-based trusted keys"
> + depends on CRYPTO_DEV_MXS_DCP >= TRUSTED_KEYS
> + default y
> + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
> + help
> + Enable use of NXP's DCP (Data Co-Processor) as trusted key backend.
> +
> if !HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS
> comment "No trust source selected!"
> endif
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
> index 735aa0bc08ef..f0f3b27f688b 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
> @@ -14,3 +14,5 @@ trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM) += tpm2key.asn1.o
> trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE) += trusted_tee.o
>
> trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM) += trusted_caam.o
> +
> +trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP) += trusted_dcp.o
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
> index fee1ab2c734d..5113aeae5628 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
> @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
> #include <keys/trusted-type.h>
> #include <keys/trusted_tee.h>
> #include <keys/trusted_caam.h>
> +#include <keys/trusted_dcp.h>
> #include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
> #include <linux/capability.h>
> #include <linux/err.h>
> @@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(rng, "Select trusted key RNG");
>
> static char *trusted_key_source;
> module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0);
> -MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee or caam)");
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee, caam or dcp)");
>
> static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = {
> #if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM)
> @@ -42,6 +43,9 @@ static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = {
> #if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM)
> { "caam", &trusted_key_caam_ops },
> #endif
> +#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP)
> + { "dcp", &dcp_trusted_key_ops },
> +#endif
> };
>
> DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_seal, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->seal);
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..4addf0970590
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2021 sigma star gmbh
> + */
> +
> +#include <crypto/aead.h>
> +#include <crypto/aes.h>
> +#include <crypto/algapi.h>
> +#include <crypto/gcm.h>
> +#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
> +#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
> +#include <linux/key-type.h>
> +#include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <linux/printk.h>
> +#include <linux/random.h>
> +#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
> +#include <soc/fsl/dcp.h>
> +
> +#define DCP_BLOB_VERSION 1
> +#define DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN 16
> +
> +/**
> + * struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format.
> + *
> + * @fmt_version: Format version, currently being %1.
> + * @blob_key: Random AES 128 key which is used to encrypt @payload,
> + * @blob_key itself is encrypted with OTP or UNIQUE device key in
> + * AES-128-ECB mode by DCP.
> + * @nonce: Random nonce used for @payload encryption.
> + * @payload_len: Length of the plain text @payload.
> + * @payload: The payload itself, encrypted using AES-128-GCM and @blob_key,
> + * GCM auth tag of size DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN is attached at the end of it.
> + *
> + * The total size of a DCP BLOB is sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + @payload_len +
> + * DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN.
> + */
> +struct dcp_blob_fmt {
> + __u8 fmt_version;
> + __u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
> + __u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
> + __le32 payload_len;
> + __u8 payload[];
> +} __packed;
> +
> +static bool use_otp_key;
> +module_param_named(dcp_use_otp_key, use_otp_key, bool, 0);
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(dcp_use_otp_key, "Use OTP instead of UNIQUE key for sealing");
> +
> +static bool skip_zk_test;
> +module_param_named(dcp_skip_zk_test, skip_zk_test, bool, 0);
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(dcp_skip_zk_test, "Don't test whether device keys are zero'ed");
> +
> +static unsigned int calc_blob_len(unsigned int payload_len)
> +{
> + return sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + payload_len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN;
> +}
> +
> +static int do_dcp_crypto(u8 *in, u8 *out, bool do_encrypt)
> +{
> + struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
> + struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
> + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
> + u8 paes_key[DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE];
> + DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
> + int res = 0;
> +
> + if (use_otp_key)
> + paes_key[0] = DCP_PAES_KEY_OTP;
> + else
> + paes_key[0] = DCP_PAES_KEY_UNIQUE;
> +
> + tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb-paes-dcp", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
> + CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL);
> + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
> + res = PTR_ERR(tfm);
> + tfm = NULL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
> + if (!req) {
> + res = -ENOMEM;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
> + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
> + crypto_req_done, &wait);
> + res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, paes_key, sizeof(paes_key));
> + if (res < 0)
> + goto out;
> +
> + sg_init_one(&src_sg, in, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
> + sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
> + skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, AES_KEYSIZE_128,
> + NULL);
> +
> + if (do_encrypt)
> + res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
> + else
> + res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req), &wait);
> +
> +out:
> + skcipher_request_free(req);
> + crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
> +
> + return res;
> +}
> +
> +static int do_aead_crypto(u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len, u8 *key, u8 *nonce,
> + bool do_encrypt)
> +{
> + struct aead_request *aead_req = NULL;
> + struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
> + struct crypto_aead *aead;
> + int ret;
> +
> + aead = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
> + if (IS_ERR(aead)) {
> + ret = PTR_ERR(aead);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(aead, DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN);
> + if (ret < 0) {
> + pr_err("Can't set crypto auth tag len: %d\n", ret);
> + goto free_aead;
> + }
> +
> + aead_req = aead_request_alloc(aead, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!aead_req) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto free_aead;
> + }
> +
> + sg_init_one(&src_sg, in, len);
> + if (do_encrypt) {
> + /*
> + * If we encrypt our buffer has extra space for the auth tag.
> + */
> + sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN);
> + } else {
> + sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, len);
> + }
> +
> + aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, len, nonce);
> + aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL,
> + NULL);
> + aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, 0);
> +
> + if (crypto_aead_setkey(aead, key, AES_KEYSIZE_128)) {
> + pr_err("Can't set crypto AEAD key\n");
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto free_req;
> + }
> +
> + if (do_encrypt)
> + ret = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
> + else
> + ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
> +
> +free_req:
> + aead_request_free(aead_req);
> +free_aead:
> + crypto_free_aead(aead);
> +out:
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int decrypt_blob_key(u8 *key)
> +{
> + return do_dcp_crypto(key, key, false);
> +}
> +
> +static int encrypt_blob_key(u8 *key)
> +{
> + return do_dcp_crypto(key, key, true);
> +}
> +
> +static int trusted_dcp_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> +{
> + struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob;
> + int blen, ret;
> +
> + blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len);
> + if (blen > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
> + return -E2BIG;
> +
> + b->fmt_version = DCP_BLOB_VERSION;
> + get_random_bytes(b->nonce, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
> + get_random_bytes(b->blob_key, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
> +
> + ret = do_aead_crypto(p->key, b->payload, p->key_len, b->blob_key,
> + b->nonce, true);
> + if (ret) {
> + pr_err("Unable to encrypt blob payload: %i\n", ret);
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> + ret = encrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key);
> + if (ret) {
> + pr_err("Unable to encrypt blob key: %i\n", ret);
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> + b->payload_len = get_unaligned_le32(&p->key_len);
> + p->blob_len = blen;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int trusted_dcp_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
> +{
> + struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob;
> + int blen, ret;
> +
> + if (b->fmt_version != DCP_BLOB_VERSION) {
> + pr_err("DCP blob has bad version: %i, expected %i\n",
> + b->fmt_version, DCP_BLOB_VERSION);
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + p->key_len = le32_to_cpu(b->payload_len);
> + blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len);
> + if (blen != p->blob_len) {
> + pr_err("DCP blob has bad length: %i != %i\n", blen,
> + p->blob_len);
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + ret = decrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key);
> + if (ret) {
> + pr_err("Unable to decrypt blob key: %i\n", ret);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + ret = do_aead_crypto(b->payload, p->key, p->key_len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN,
> + b->blob_key, b->nonce, false);
> + if (ret) {
> + pr_err("Unwrap of DCP payload failed: %i\n", ret);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + ret = 0;
> +out:
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int test_for_zero_key(void)
> +{
> + static const u8 bad[] = {0x9a, 0xda, 0xe0, 0x54, 0xf6, 0x3d, 0xfa, 0xff,
> + 0x5e, 0xa1, 0x8e, 0x45, 0xed, 0xf6, 0xea, 0x6f};
nit: inline comment about 'bad'.
> + void *buf = NULL;
> + int ret = 0;
> +
> + if (skip_zk_test)
> + goto out;
> +
> + buf = kmalloc(AES_BLOCK_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!buf) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + memset(buf, 0x55, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
> +
> + ret = do_dcp_crypto(buf, buf, true);
> + if (ret)
> + goto out;
> +
> + if (memcmp(buf, bad, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0) {
> + pr_err("Device neither in secure nor trusted mode!\n");
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + }
> +out:
> + kfree(buf);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int trusted_dcp_init(void)
> +{
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (use_otp_key)
> + pr_info("Using DCP OTP key\n");
> +
> + ret = test_for_zero_key();
> + if (ret) {
> + pr_err("Test for zero'ed keys failed: %i\n", ret);
I'm not sure whether this should err or warn.
What sort of situations can cause the test the fail (e.g.
adversary/interposer, bad configuration etc.).
BR, Jarkko
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