[PATCH] powerpc/pseries: Whitelist dtl slub object for copying to userspace
Kees Cook
kees at kernel.org
Fri Jun 21 04:59:12 AEST 2024
On Thu, Jun 20, 2024 at 10:58:49PM +0530, Anjali K wrote:
> However given that:
> (i) The dtl buffer is read-only. The dtl trace is a set of metrics which
> are collected to be read by privileged users.
> (ii) Users usually reads all the dtl entries, not a subset.
> (iii) Read overflows are unlikely to expose anything useful to attackers
> since we are whitelisting the complete slub object and there are no
> contiguous memory locations which need to be hidden.
> Can we go ahead with the whitelisting using kmem_cache_create_usercopy()
> approach?
> Or are there other reasons to prefer the bounce buffer approach?
Yeah, based on this and what mpe said, I have no objection to just
allowing it in kmem_cache_create_usercopy(). I was mainly just curious
what the threat model was. :)
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees at kernel.org>
--
Kees Cook
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