[PATCH v13 13/35] KVM: Introduce per-page memory attributes

Huang, Kai kai.huang at intel.com
Thu Nov 2 14:01:11 AEDT 2023

On Fri, 2023-10-27 at 11:21 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> From: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng at linux.intel.com>
> In confidential computing usages, whether a page is private or shared is
> necessary information for KVM to perform operations like page fault
> handling, page zapping etc. There are other potential use cases for
> per-page memory attributes, e.g. to make memory read-only (or no-exec,
> or exec-only, etc.) without having to modify memslots.
> Introduce two ioctls (advertised by KVM_CAP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES) to allow
> userspace to operate on the per-page memory attributes.
>   - KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES to set the per-page memory attributes to
>     a guest memory range.
>   - KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES to return the KVM supported
>     memory attributes.
> Use an xarray to store the per-page attributes internally, with a naive,
> not fully optimized implementation, i.e. prioritize correctness over
> performance for the initial implementation.
> Use bit 3 for the PRIVATE attribute so that KVM can use bits 0-2 for RWX
> attributes/protections in the future, e.g. to give userspace fine-grained
> control over read, write, and execute protections for guest memory.
> Provide arch hooks for handling attribute changes before and after common
> code sets the new attributes, e.g. x86 will use the "pre" hook to zap all
> relevant mappings, and the "post" hook to track whether or not hugepages
> can be used to map the range.
> To simplify the implementation wrap the entire sequence with
> kvm_mmu_invalidate_{begin,end}() even though the operation isn't strictly
> guaranteed to be an invalidation.  For the initial use case, x86 *will*
> always invalidate memory, and preventing arch code from creating new
> mappings while the attributes are in flux makes it much easier to reason
> about the correctness of consuming attributes.
> It's possible that future usages may not require an invalidation, e.g.
> if KVM ends up supporting RWX protections and userspace grants _more_
> protections, but again opt for simplicity and punt optimizations to
> if/when they are needed.
> Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc at google.com>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Y2WB48kD0J4VGynX@google.com
> Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba at google.com>
> Cc: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu at intel.com>
> Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic at digikod.net>
> Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng at linux.intel.com>
> Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc at google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc at google.com>


> +Note, there is no "get" API.  Userspace is responsible for explicitly tracking
> +the state of a gfn/page as needed.
> +


> +static inline unsigned long kvm_get_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
> +{
> +	return xa_to_value(xa_load(&kvm->mem_attr_array, gfn));
> +}

Only call xa_to_value() when xa_load() returns !NULL?

> +
> +bool kvm_range_has_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end,
> +				     unsigned long attrs);

Seems it's not immediately clear why this function is needed in this patch,
especially when you said there is no "get" API above.  Add some material to

> +bool kvm_arch_pre_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm,
> +					struct kvm_gfn_range *range);
> +bool kvm_arch_post_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm,
> +					 struct kvm_gfn_range *range);

Looks if this Kconfig is on, the above two arch hooks won't have implementation.

Is it better to have two __weak empty versions here in this patch?

Anyway, from the changelog it seems it's not mandatory for some ARCH to provide
the above two if one wants to turn this on, i.e., the two hooks can be empty and
the ARCH can just use the __weak version.

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