[PATCH v2 08/12] powerpc/ptrace: Expose HASHKEYR register to ptrace

Russell Currey ruscur at russell.cc
Mon May 8 14:32:36 AEST 2023

On Thu, 2023-03-30 at 16:50 +1100, Benjamin Gray wrote:
> The HASHKEYR register contains a secret per-process key to enable
> unique
> hashes per process. In general it should not be exposed to userspace
> at all and a regular process has no need to know its key.
> However, checkpoint restore in userspace (CRIU) functionality
> requires
> that a process be able to set the HASHKEYR of another process,
> otherwise
> existing hashes on the stack would be invalidated by a new random
> key.
> Exposing HASHKEYR in this way also makes it appear in core dumps,
> which
> is a security concern. Multiple threads may share a key, for example
> just after a fork() call, where the kernel cannot know if the child
> is
> going to return back along the parent's stack. If such a thread is
> coerced into making a core dump, then the HASHKEYR value will be
> readable and able to be used against all other threads sharing that
> key,
> effectively undoing any protection offered by hashst/hashchk.
> Therefore we expose HASHKEYR to ptrace when CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
> is
> enabled, providing a choice of increased security or migratable ROP
> protected processes. This is similar to how ARM exposes its PAC keys.
> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gray <bgray at linux.ibm.com>

Seems sensible

Reviewed-by: Russell Currey <ruscur at russell.cc>

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