[PATCH 1/2] pid: add pidfd_open()

[Christian Brauner]

On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 04:00:20PM +0200, Yann Droneaud wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> Le mercredi 15 mai 2019 à 12:03 +0200, Christian Brauner a écrit :
> > 
> > diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c
> > index 20881598bdfa..237d18d6ecb8 100644
> > --- a/kernel/pid.c
> > +++ b/kernel/pid.c
> > @@ -451,6 +452,53 @@ struct pid *find_ge_pid(int nr, struct
> > pid_namespace *ns)
> >  	return idr_get_next(&ns->idr, &nr);
> >  }
> >  
> > +/**
> > + * pidfd_open() - Open new pid file descriptor.
> > + *
> > + * @pid:   pid for which to retrieve a pidfd
> > + * @flags: flags to pass
> > + *
> > + * This creates a new pid file descriptor with the O_CLOEXEC flag set for
> > + * the process identified by @pid. Currently, the process identified by
> > + * @pid must be a thread-group leader. This restriction currently exists
> > + * for all aspects of pidfds including pidfd creation (CLONE_PIDFD cannot
> > + * be used with CLONE_THREAD) and pidfd polling (only supports thread group
> > + * leaders).
> > + *
> 
> Would it be possible to create file descriptor with "restricted"
> operation ?
> 
> - O_RDONLY: waiting for process completion allowed (for example)
> - O_WRONLY: sending process signal allowed

Yes, something like this is likely going to be possible in the future.
We had discussion around this. But mapping this to O_RDONLY and O_WRONLY
is not the right model. It makes more sense to have specialized flags
that restrict actions.

> 
> For example, a process could send over a Unix socket a process a pidfd,
> allowing this to only wait for completion, but not sending signal ?
> 
> I see the permission check is not done in pidfd_open(), so what prevent
> a user from sending a signal to another user owned process ?

That's supposed to be possible. You can do the same right now already
with pids. Tools like LMK need this probably very much.
Permission checking for signals is done at send time right now.
And if you can't signal via a pid you can't signal via a pidfd as
they're both subject to the same permissions checks.

> 
> If it's in pidfd_send_signal(), then, passing the socket through
> SCM_RIGHT won't be useful if the target process is not owned by the
> same user, or root.
> 
> > + * Return: On success, a cloexec pidfd is returned.
> > + *         On error, a negative errno number will be returned.
> > + */
> > +SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pidfd_open, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, flags)
> > +{
> > +	int fd, ret;
> > +	struct pid *p;
> > +	struct task_struct *tsk;
> > +
> > +	if (flags)
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +	if (pid <= 0)
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +	p = find_get_pid(pid);
> > +	if (!p)
> > +		return -ESRCH;
> > +
> > +	rcu_read_lock();
> > +	tsk = pid_task(p, PIDTYPE_PID);
> > +	if (!tsk)
> > +		ret = -ESRCH;
> > +	else if (unlikely(!thread_group_leader(tsk)))
> > +		ret = -EINVAL;
> > +	else
> > +		ret = 0;
> > +	rcu_read_unlock();
> > +
> > +	fd = ret ?: pidfd_create(p);
> > +	put_pid(p);
> > +	return fd;
> > +}
> > +
> >  void __init pid_idr_init(void)
> >  {
> >  	/* Verify no one has done anything silly: */
> 
> Regards.
> 
> -- 
> Yann Droneaud
> OPTEYA
> 
>