[PATCH 2/2] powerpc/perf: Fix the kernel address leak to userspace via SDAR
Naveen N. Rao
naveen.n.rao at linux.vnet.ibm.com
Mon Mar 5 19:21:21 AEDT 2018
Madhavan Srinivasan wrote:
> Sampled Data Address Register (SDAR) is a 64-bit
> register that contains the effective address of
> the storage operand of an instruction that was
> being executed, possibly out-of-order, at or around
> the time that the Performance Monitor alert occurred.
>
> In certain scenario SDAR happen to contain the kernel
> address even for userspace only sampling. Add checks
> to prevent it.
>
> Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy at linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> ---
> arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c | 11 ++++++++---
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c b/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c
> index 337db5831749..c4525323d691 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c
> @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static inline unsigned long perf_ip_adjust(struct pt_regs *regs)
> {
> return 0;
> }
> -static inline void perf_get_data_addr(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp) { }
> +static inline void perf_get_data_addr(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp, struct perf_event *event) { }
> static inline u32 perf_get_misc_flags(struct pt_regs *regs)
> {
> return 0;
> @@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static inline unsigned long perf_ip_adjust(struct pt_regs *regs)
> * pointed to by SIAR; this is indicated by the [POWER6_]MMCRA_SDSYNC, the
> * [POWER7P_]MMCRA_SDAR_VALID bit in MMCRA, or the SDAR_VALID bit in SIER.
> */
> -static inline void perf_get_data_addr(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp)
> +static inline void perf_get_data_addr(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp, struct perf_event *event)
> {
> unsigned long mmcra = regs->dsisr;
> bool sdar_valid;
> @@ -198,6 +198,11 @@ static inline void perf_get_data_addr(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp)
>
> if (!(mmcra & MMCRA_SAMPLE_ENABLE) || sdar_valid)
> *addrp = mfspr(SPRN_SDAR);
> +
> + if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
> + (event->attr.exclude_kernel || event->attr.exclude_hv) &&
I may be missing something, but if !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN), should we
still check the exclude_kernel/exclude_hv fields in the event attribute?
Aren't those user controlled?
- Naveen
> + is_kernel_addr(mfspr(SPRN_SDAR)))
> + *addrp = 0;
> }
>
> static bool regs_sihv(struct pt_regs *regs)
> @@ -2054,7 +2059,7 @@ static void record_and_restart(struct perf_event *event, unsigned long val,
>
> if (event->attr.sample_type &
> (PERF_SAMPLE_ADDR | PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR))
> - perf_get_data_addr(regs, &data.addr);
> + perf_get_data_addr(regs, &data.addr, event);
>
> if (event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_STACK) {
> struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw;
> --
> 2.7.4
>
>
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