[RFC PATCH kernel 0/5] powerpc/P9/vfio: Pass through NVIDIA Tesla V100

Alex Williamson alex.williamson at redhat.com
Wed Aug 1 00:29:05 AEST 2018


On Tue, 31 Jul 2018 14:03:35 +1000
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik at ozlabs.ru> wrote:

> On 31/07/2018 02:29, Alex Williamson wrote:
> > On Mon, 30 Jul 2018 18:58:49 +1000
> > Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik at ozlabs.ru> wrote:
> >> After some local discussions, it was pointed out that force disabling
> >> nvlinks won't bring us much as for an nvlink to work, both sides need to
> >> enable it so malicious guests cannot penetrate good ones (or a host)
> >> unless a good guest enabled the link but won't happen with a well
> >> behaving guest. And if two guests became malicious, then can still only
> >> harm each other, and so can they via other ways such network. This is
> >> different from PCIe as once PCIe link is unavoidably enabled, a well
> >> behaving device cannot firewall itself from peers as it is up to the
> >> upstream bridge(s) now to decide the routing; with nvlink2, a GPU still
> >> has means to protect itself, just like a guest can run "firewalld" for
> >> network.
> >>
> >> Although it would be a nice feature to have an extra barrier between
> >> GPUs, is inability to block the links in hypervisor still a blocker for
> >> V100 pass through?  
> > 
> > How is the NVLink configured by the guest, is it 'on'/'off' or are
> > specific routes configured?   
> 
> The GPU-GPU links need not to be blocked and need to be enabled
> (==trained) by a driver in the guest. There are no routes between GPUs
> in NVLink fabric, these are direct links, it is just a switch on each
> side, both switches need to be on for a link to work.

Ok, but there is at least the possibility of multiple direct links per
GPU, the very first diagram I find of NVlink shows 8 interconnected
GPUs:

https://www.nvidia.com/en-us/data-center/nvlink/

So if each switch enables one direct, point to point link, how does the
guest know which links to open for which peer device?  And of course
since we can't see the spec, a security audit is at best hearsay :-\
 
> The GPU-CPU links - the GPU bit is the same switch, the CPU NVlink state
> is controlled via the emulated PCI bridges which I pass through together
> with the GPU.

So there's a special emulated switch, is that how the guest knows which
GPUs it can enable NVLinks to?

> > If the former, then isn't a non-malicious
> > guest still susceptible to a malicious guest?  
> 
> A non-malicious guest needs to turn its switch on for a link to a GPU
> which belongs to a malicious guest.

Actual security, or obfuscation, will we ever know...

> > If the latter, how is
> > routing configured by the guest given that the guest view of the
> > topology doesn't match physical hardware?  Are these routes
> > deconfigured by device reset?  Are they part of the save/restore
> > state?  Thanks,  

Still curious what happens to these routes on reset.  Can a later user
of a GPU inherit a device where the links are already enabled?  Thanks,

Alex


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