[2/3] powerpc/mm: Preserve CFAR value on SLB miss caused by access to bogus address

[Michael Ellerman]

On Fri, 2016-02-09 at 11:49:21 UTC, Paul Mackerras wrote:
> Currently, if userspace or the kernel accesses a completely bogus address,
> for example with any of bits 46-59 set, we first take an SLB miss interrupt,
> install a corresponding SLB entry with VSID 0, retry the instruction, then
> take a DSI/ISI interrupt because there is no HPT entry mapping the address.
> However, by the time of the second interrupt, the Come-From Address Register
> (CFAR) has been overwritten by the rfid instruction at the end of the SLB
> miss interrupt handler.  Since bogus accesses can often be caused by a
> function return after the stack has been overwritten, the CFAR value would
> be very useful as it could indicate which function it was whose return had
> led to the bogus address.
> 
> This patch adds code to create a full exception frame in the SLB miss handler
> in the case of a bogus address, rather than inserting an SLB entry with a
> zero VSID field.  Then we call a new slb_miss_bad_addr() function in C code,
> which delivers a signal for a user access or creates an oops for a kernel
> access.  In the latter case the oops message will show the CFAR value at the
> time of the access.
> 
> In the case of the radix MMU, a segment miss interrupt indicates an access
> outside the ranges mapped by the page tables.  Previously this was handled
> by the code for an unrecoverable SLB miss (one with MSR[RI] = 0), which is
> not really correct.  With this patch, we now handle these interrupts with
> slb_miss_bad_addr(), which is much more consistent.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus at ozlabs.org>
> Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar at linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Applied to powerpc next, thanks.

https://git.kernel.org/powerpc/c/f0f558b131db0e793fd90aac5d

cheers