[PATCH 5/5] vfio-pci: Allow to mmap MSI-X table if interrupt remapping is supported

Yongji Xie xyjxie at linux.vnet.ibm.com
Thu May 5 23:28:55 AEST 2016

On 2016/5/5 20:15, Tian, Kevin wrote:

>> From: Yongji Xie [mailto:xyjxie at linux.vnet.ibm.com]
>> Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 7:43 PM
>> Hi David and Kevin,
>> On 2016/5/5 17:54, David Laight wrote:
>>> From: Tian, Kevin
>>>> Sent: 05 May 2016 10:37
>>> ...
>>>>> Acutually, we are not aimed at accessing MSI-X table from
>>>>> guest. So I think it's safe to passthrough MSI-X table if we
>>>>> can make sure guest kernel would not touch MSI-X table in
>>>>> normal code path such as para-virtualized guest kernel on PPC64.
>>>> Then how do you prevent malicious guest kernel accessing it?
>>> Or a malicious guest driver for an ethernet card setting up
>>> the receive buffer ring to contain a single word entry that
>>> contains the address associated with an MSI-X interrupt and
>>> then using a loopback mode to cause a specific packet be
>>> received that writes the required word through that address.
>>> Remember the PCIe cycle for an interrupt is a normal memory write
>>> cycle.
>>> 	David
>> If we have enough permission to load a malicious driver or
>> kernel, we can easily break the guest without exposed
>> MSI-X table.
>> I think it should be safe to expose MSI-X table if we can
>> make sure that malicious guest driver/kernel can't use
>> the MSI-X table to break other guest or host. The
>> capability of IRQ remapping could provide this
>> kind of protection.
> With IRQ remapping it doesn't mean you can pass through MSI-X
> structure to guest. I know actual IRQ remapping might be platform
> specific, but at least for Intel VT-d specification, MSI-X entry must
> be configured with a remappable format by host kernel which
> contains an index into IRQ remapping table. The index will find a
> IRQ remapping entry which controls interrupt routing for a specific
> device. If you allow a malicious program random index into MSI-X
> entry of assigned device, the hole is obvious...

Do you mean we can trigger MSIs that correspond to interrupt
IDs of other devices by writing to MSI-X table although IRQ
remapping is enabled?

On PPC64, there is a mapping between MSIs and PE num
which can be used to identify a PCI device on PHB. So the
hardware can ensure a given pci device can only shoot the
MSIs assigned for it.  Isn't there a similar mapping in IRQ
remapping table on Intel.


> Above might make sense only for a IRQ remapping implementation
> which doesn't rely on extended MSI-X format (e.g. simply based on
> BDF). If that's the case for PPC, then you should build MSI-X
> passthrough based on this fact instead of general IRQ remapping
> enabled or not.
> Thanks
> Kevin

More information about the Linuxppc-dev mailing list