[PATCH v3 00/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
keescook at chromium.org
Thu Jul 21 01:31:37 AEST 2016
On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 2:52 AM, David Laight <David.Laight at aculab.com> wrote:
> From: Kees Cook
>> Sent: 15 July 2016 22:44
>> This is a start of the mainline port of PAX_USERCOPY.
>> - if address range is in the current process stack, it must be within the
>> current stack frame (if such checking is possible) or at least entirely
>> within the current process's stack.
> That description doesn't seem quite right to me.
> I presume the check is:
> Within the current process's stack and not crossing the ends of the
> current stack frame.
Actually, it's a bad description all around. :) The check is that the
range is within a valid stack frame (current or any prior caller's
frame). i.e. it does not cross a frame or touch the saved frame
pointer nor instruction pointer.
> The 'current' stack frame is likely to be that of copy_to/from_user().
> Even if you use the stack of the caller, any problematic buffers
> are likely to have been passed in from a calling function.
> So unless you are going to walk the stack (good luck on that)
> I'm not sure checking the stack frames is worth it.
Yup: that's exactly what it's doing: walking up the stack. :)
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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