[PATCH 3/4] KVM: PPC: Add support for IOMMU in-kernel handling

[Alex Williamson]

On Mon, 2013-06-17 at 08:39 +1000, Benjamin Herrenschmidt wrote:
> On Wed, 2013-06-05 at 16:11 +1000, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> > +long kvm_vm_ioctl_create_spapr_tce_iommu(struct kvm *kvm,
> > +               struct kvm_create_spapr_tce_iommu *args)
> > +{
> > +       struct kvmppc_spapr_tce_table *tt = NULL;
> > +       struct iommu_group *grp;
> > +       struct iommu_table *tbl;
> > +
> > +       /* Find an IOMMU table for the given ID */
> > +       grp = iommu_group_get_by_id(args->iommu_id);
> > +       if (!grp)
> > +               return -ENXIO;
> > +
> > +       tbl = iommu_group_get_iommudata(grp);
> > +       if (!tbl)
> > +               return -ENXIO;
> 
> So Alex Graf pointed out here, there is a security issue here, or are we
> missing something ?
> 
> What prevents a malicious program that has access to /dev/kvm from
> taking over random iommu groups (including host used ones) that way?
> 
> What is the security model of that whole iommu stuff to begin with ?

IOMMU groups themselves don't provide security, they're accessed by
interfaces like VFIO, which provide the security.  Given a brief look, I
agree, this looks like a possible backdoor.  The typical VFIO way to
handle this would be to pass a VFIO file descriptor here to prove that
the process has access to the IOMMU group.  This is how /dev/vfio/vfio
gains the ability to setup an IOMMU domain an do mappings with the
SET_CONTAINER ioctl using a group fd.  Thanks,

Alex