[PATCH 1/2] vfio powerpc: implemented IOMMU driver for VFIO
David Gibson
david at gibson.dropbear.id.au
Tue Nov 27 16:06:00 EST 2012
On Tue, Nov 27, 2012 at 03:58:14PM +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> On 27/11/12 15:29, Alex Williamson wrote:
> >On Tue, 2012-11-27 at 15:06 +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> >>On 27/11/12 05:20, Alex Williamson wrote:
> >>>On Fri, 2012-11-23 at 20:03 +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
> >>>>VFIO implements platform independent stuff such as
> >>>>a PCI driver, BAR access (via read/write on a file descriptor
> >>>>or direct mapping when possible) and IRQ signaling.
> >>>>
> >>>>The platform dependent part includes IOMMU initialization
> >>>>and handling. This patch implements an IOMMU driver for VFIO
> >>>>which does mapping/unmapping pages for the guest IO and
> >>>>provides information about DMA window (required by a POWERPC
> >>>>guest).
> >>>>
> >>>>The counterpart in QEMU is required to support this functionality.
> >>>>
> >>>>Cc: David Gibson <david at gibson.dropbear.id.au>
> >>>>Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik at ozlabs.ru>
> >>>>---
> >>>> drivers/vfio/Kconfig | 6 +
> >>>> drivers/vfio/Makefile | 1 +
> >>>> drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c | 247 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >>>> include/linux/vfio.h | 20 +++
> >>>> 4 files changed, 274 insertions(+)
> >>>> create mode 100644 drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
> >>>>
> >>>>diff --git a/drivers/vfio/Kconfig b/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
> >>>>index 7cd5dec..b464687 100644
> >>>>--- a/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
> >>>>+++ b/drivers/vfio/Kconfig
> >>>>@@ -3,10 +3,16 @@ config VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1
> >>>> depends on VFIO
> >>>> default n
> >>>>
> >>>>+config VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE
> >>>>+ tristate
> >>>>+ depends on VFIO && SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU
> >>>>+ default n
> >>>>+
> >>>> menuconfig VFIO
> >>>> tristate "VFIO Non-Privileged userspace driver framework"
> >>>> depends on IOMMU_API
> >>>> select VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1 if X86
> >>>>+ select VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE if PPC_POWERNV
> >>>> help
> >>>> VFIO provides a framework for secure userspace device drivers.
> >>>> See Documentation/vfio.txt for more details.
> >>>>diff --git a/drivers/vfio/Makefile b/drivers/vfio/Makefile
> >>>>index 2398d4a..72bfabc 100644
> >>>>--- a/drivers/vfio/Makefile
> >>>>+++ b/drivers/vfio/Makefile
> >>>>@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
> >>>> obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO) += vfio.o
> >>>> obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1) += vfio_iommu_type1.o
> >>>>+obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE) += vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.o
> >>>> obj-$(CONFIG_VFIO_PCI) += pci/
> >>>>diff --git a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
> >>>>new file mode 100644
> >>>>index 0000000..46a6298
> >>>>--- /dev/null
> >>>>+++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_spapr_tce.c
> >>>>@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
> >>>>+/*
> >>>>+ * VFIO: IOMMU DMA mapping support for TCE on POWER
> >>>>+ *
> >>>>+ * Copyright (C) 2012 IBM Corp. All rights reserved.
> >>>>+ * Author: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik at ozlabs.ru>
> >>>>+ *
> >>>>+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
> >>>>+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
> >>>>+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
> >>>>+ *
> >>>>+ * Derived from original vfio_iommu_type1.c:
> >>>>+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
> >>>>+ * Author: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson at redhat.com>
> >>>>+ */
> >>>>+
> >>>>+#include <linux/module.h>
> >>>>+#include <linux/pci.h>
> >>>>+#include <linux/slab.h>
> >>>>+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> >>>>+#include <linux/err.h>
> >>>>+#include <linux/vfio.h>
> >>>>+#include <asm/iommu.h>
> >>>>+
> >>>>+#define DRIVER_VERSION "0.1"
> >>>>+#define DRIVER_AUTHOR "aik at ozlabs.ru"
> >>>>+#define DRIVER_DESC "VFIO IOMMU SPAPR TCE"
> >>>>+
> >>>>+static void tce_iommu_detach_group(void *iommu_data,
> >>>>+ struct iommu_group *iommu_group);
> >>>>+
> >>>>+/*
> >>>>+ * VFIO IOMMU fd for SPAPR_TCE IOMMU implementation
> >>>>+ */
> >>>>+
> >>>>+/*
> >>>>+ * The container descriptor supports only a single group per container.
> >>>>+ * Required by the API as the container is not supplied with the IOMMU group
> >>>>+ * at the moment of initialization.
> >>>>+ */
> >>>>+struct tce_container {
> >>>>+ struct mutex lock;
> >>>>+ struct iommu_table *tbl;
> >>>>+};
> >>>>+
> >>>>+static void *tce_iommu_open(unsigned long arg)
> >>>>+{
> >>>>+ struct tce_container *container;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ if (arg != VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU) {
> >>>>+ printk(KERN_ERR "tce_vfio: Wrong IOMMU type\n");
> >>>>+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> >>>>+ }
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ container = kzalloc(sizeof(*container), GFP_KERNEL);
> >>>>+ if (!container)
> >>>>+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ mutex_init(&container->lock);
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ return container;
> >>>>+}
> >>>>+
> >>>>+static void tce_iommu_release(void *iommu_data)
> >>>>+{
> >>>>+ struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ WARN_ON(container->tbl && !container->tbl->it_group);
> >>>
> >>>I think your patch ordering is backwards here. it_group isn't added
> >>>until 2/2. I'd really like to see the arch/powerpc code approved and
> >>>merged by the powerpc maintainer before we add the code that makes use
> >>>of it into vfio. Otherwise we just get lots of churn if interfaces
> >>>change or they disapprove of it altogether.
> >>
> >>
> >>Makes sense, thanks.
> >>
> >>
> >>>>+ if (container->tbl && container->tbl->it_group)
> >>>>+ tce_iommu_detach_group(iommu_data, container->tbl->it_group);
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ mutex_destroy(&container->lock);
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ kfree(container);
> >>>>+}
> >>>>+
> >>>>+static long tce_iommu_ioctl(void *iommu_data,
> >>>>+ unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
> >>>>+{
> >>>>+ struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
> >>>>+ unsigned long minsz;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ switch (cmd) {
> >>>>+ case VFIO_CHECK_EXTENSION: {
> >>>>+ return (arg == VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU) ? 1 : 0;
> >>>>+ }
> >>>>+ case VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO: {
> >>>>+ struct vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info info;
> >>>>+ struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
> >>>>+ return -ENXIO;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ minsz = offsetofend(struct vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info,
> >>>>+ dma64_window_size);
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ if (copy_from_user(&info, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
> >>>>+ return -EFAULT;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ if (info.argsz < minsz)
> >>>>+ return -EINVAL;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ info.dma32_window_start = tbl->it_offset << IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT;
> >>>>+ info.dma32_window_size = tbl->it_size << IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT;
> >>>>+ info.dma64_window_start = 0;
> >>>>+ info.dma64_window_size = 0;
> >>>>+ info.flags = 0;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &info, minsz))
> >>>>+ return -EFAULT;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ return 0;
> >>>>+ }
> >>>>+ case VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA: {
> >>>>+ vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_map param;
> >>>>+ struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
> >>>>+ enum dma_data_direction direction = DMA_NONE;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
> >>>>+ return -ENXIO;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ minsz = offsetofend(vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_map, size);
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ if (copy_from_user(¶m, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
> >>>>+ return -EFAULT;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ if (param.argsz < minsz)
> >>>>+ return -EINVAL;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ if ((param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ) &&
> >>>>+ (param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE)) {
> >>>>+ direction = DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL;
> >>>>+ } else if (param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ) {
> >>>>+ direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
> >>>>+ } else if (param.flags & VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE) {
> >>>>+ direction = DMA_FROM_DEVICE;
> >>>>+ }
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ param.size += param.iova & ~IOMMU_PAGE_MASK;
> >>>>+ param.size = _ALIGN_UP(param.size, IOMMU_PAGE_SIZE);
> >>>
> >>>On x86 we force iova, vaddr, and size to all be aligned to the smallest
> >>>page granularity of the iommu and return -EINVAL if it doesn't fit.
> >>>What does it imply to the user if they're always aligned to work here?
> >>>Won't this interface happily map overlapping entries with no indication
> >>>to the user that the previous mapping is no longer valid?
> >>>Maybe another reason why a combined unmap/map makes me nervous, we have
> >>>to assume the user knows what they're doing.
> >>
> >>
> >>I got used to guests which do know what they are doing so I am pretty calm :)
> >>but ok, I'll move alignment to the QEMU, it makes sense.
> >>
> >>
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ return iommu_put_tces(tbl, param.iova >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT,
> >>>>+ param.vaddr & IOMMU_PAGE_MASK, direction,
> >>>>+ param.size >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT);
> >>>>+ }
> >>>>+ case VFIO_IOMMU_UNMAP_DMA: {
> >>>>+ vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_unmap param;
> >>>>+ struct iommu_table *tbl = container->tbl;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ if (WARN_ON(!tbl))
> >>>>+ return -ENXIO;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ minsz = offsetofend(vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_dma_unmap, size);
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ if (copy_from_user(¶m, (void __user *)arg, minsz))
> >>>>+ return -EFAULT;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ if (param.argsz < minsz)
> >>>>+ return -EINVAL;
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ param.size += param.iova & ~IOMMU_PAGE_MASK;
> >>>>+ param.size = _ALIGN_UP(param.size, IOMMU_PAGE_SIZE);
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ return iommu_put_tces(tbl, param.iova >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT,
> >>>>+ 0, DMA_NONE, param.size >> IOMMU_PAGE_SHIFT);
> >>>>+ }
> >>>>+ default:
> >>>>+ printk(KERN_WARNING "tce_vfio: unexpected cmd %x\n", cmd);
> >>>
> >>>pr_warn
> >>>
> >>>>+ }
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ return -ENOTTY;
> >>>>+}
> >>>>+
> >>>>+static int tce_iommu_attach_group(void *iommu_data,
> >>>>+ struct iommu_group *iommu_group)
> >>>>+{
> >>>>+ struct tce_container *container = iommu_data;
> >>>>+ struct iommu_table *tbl = iommu_group_get_iommudata(iommu_group);
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ BUG_ON(!tbl);
> >>>>+ mutex_lock(&container->lock);
> >>>>+ pr_debug("tce_vfio: Attaching group #%u to iommu %p\n",
> >>>>+ iommu_group_id(iommu_group), iommu_group);
> >>>>+ if (container->tbl) {
> >>>>+ printk(KERN_WARNING "tce_vfio: Only one group per IOMMU container is allowed, existing id=%d, attaching id=%d\n",
> >>>
> >>>pr_warn
> >>>
> >>>>+ iommu_group_id(container->tbl->it_group),
> >>>>+ iommu_group_id(iommu_group));
> >>>>+ mutex_unlock(&container->lock);
> >>>>+ return -EBUSY;
> >>>>+ }
> >>>>+
> >>>>+ container->tbl = tbl;
> >>>
> >>>Would it be too much paranoia to clear all the tce here as you do below
> >>>on detach?
> >>
> >>Guess so. I do unmap on detach() and the guest calls put_tce(0) (i.e.
> >>unmaps) the whole DMA window at the boot time.
> >
> >But that's just one user of this interface, we can't assume they'll all
> >be so agreeable. If any tces were enabled here, a malicious user would
> >have a window to host memory, right? Thanks,
>
>
> But I still release pages on detach(), how can this code be not
> called on the guest exit (normal or crashed)?
I think the concern is about robustness if some bug elsewhere in the
kernel left some TCE entries in place before the table was handed over
to VFIO.
--
David Gibson | I'll have my music baroque, and my code
david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au | minimalist, thank you. NOT _the_ _other_
| _way_ _around_!
http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson
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