[PATCH 3/5] v2 seccomp_filters: Enable ftrace-based system call filtering

[James Morris]

On Tue, 17 May 2011, Ingo Molnar wrote:

> I'm not sure i get your point.

Your example was not complete as described.  After an apparently simple 
specification, you've since added several qualifiers and assumptions, and 
I still doubt that it's complete.

A higher level goal would look like

"Allow a sandbox app access only to approved resources, to contain the 
effects of flaws in the app", or similar.

Note that this includes a threat model (remote attacker taking control of 
the app) and a general and fully stated strategy for dealing with it.

>From there, you can start to analyze how to implement the goal, at which 
point you'd start thinking about configuration, assumptions, filesystem 
access, namespaces, indirect access (e.g. via sockets, rpc, ipc, shared 
memory, invocation).

Anyway, this is getting off track from the main discussion, but you 
asked...



- James
-- 
James Morris
<jmorris at namei.org>