[PATCH 3/5] v2 seccomp_filters: Enable ftrace-based system call filtering

[Ingo Molnar]

* Kees Cook <kees.cook at canonical.com> wrote:

> Hi,
> 
> On Thu, May 12, 2011 at 09:48:50AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> > 1) We already have a specific ABI for this: you can set filters for events via 
> >    an event fd.
> > 
> >    Why not extend that mechanism instead and improve *both* your sandboxing
> >    bits and the events code? This new seccomp code has a lot more
> >    to do with trace event filters than the minimal old seccomp code ...
> 
> Would this require privileges to get the event fd to start with? [...]

No special privileges with the default perf_events_paranoid value.

> [...] If so, I would prefer to avoid that, since using prctl() as shown in 
> the patch set won't require any privs.

and we could also explicitly allow syscall events without any privileges, 
regardless of the setting of 'perf_events_paranoid' config value.

Obviously a sandboxing host process wants to run with as low privileges as it 
can.

Thanks,

	Ingo