[RFC] fs-verity and encryption for EROFS

[Gao Xiang]

Hi Eric,

On Fri, Dec 30, 2022 at 01:13:49PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> Hi Gao,
> 
> On Thu, Dec 22, 2022 at 11:24:34AM +0800, Gao Xiang wrote:
> > ( + more lists )
> > 
> > On Wed, Dec 21, 2022 at 02:41:40PM +0800, Gao Xiang wrote:
> > > Hi folks,
> > > 
> > > (As Eric suggested, I post it on list now..)
> > > 
> > > In order to outline what we could do next to benefit various image-based
> > > distribution use cases (especially for signed+verified images and
> > > confidential computing), I'd like to discuss two potential new
> > > features for EROFS: verification and encryption.
> > > 
> > > - Verification
> > > 
> > > As we're known that currently dm-verity is mainly used for read-only
> > > devices to keep the image integrity.  However, if we consider an
> > > image-based system with lots of shared blobs (no matter they are
> > > device-based or file-based).  IMHO, it'd be better to have an in-band
> > > (rather than a device-mapper out-of-band) approach to verify such blobs.
> > > 
> > > In particular, currently in container image use cases, an EROFS image
> > > can consist of
> > > 
> > >   - one meta blob for metadata and filesystem tree;
> > > 
> > >   - several data-shared blobs with chunk-based de-duplicated data (in
> > >     layers to form the incremental update way; or some other ways like
> > >     one file-one blob)
> > > 
> > > Currently data blobs can be varied from (typically) dozen blobs to (in
> > > principle) 2^16 - 1 blobs.  dm-verity setup is much hard to cover such
> > > usage but that distribution form is more and more common with the
> > > revolution of containerization.
> > > 
> > > Also since we have EROFS over fscache infrastructure, file-based
> > > distribution makes dm-verity almost impossible as well. Generally we
> > > could enable underlayfs fs-verity I think, but considering on-demand
> > > lazy pulling from remote, such data may be incomplete before data is
> > > fully downloaded. (I think that is also almost like what Google did
> > > fs-verity for incfs.)  In addition, IMO it's not good if we rely on
> > > features of a random underlay fs with generated tree from random
> > > hashing algorithm and no original signing (by image creator).
> > 
> > random hashing algorithm, underlay block sizes, (maybe) new underlay
> > layout and no original signing, which impacts reproduction.
> > 
> > > 
> > > My preliminary thought for EROFS on verification is to have blob-based
> > > (or device-based) merkle trees but makes such image integrity
> > > self-contained so that Android, embedded, system rootfs, and container
> > > use cases can all benefit from it.. 
> > > 
> > > Also as a self-containerd verfication approaches as the other Linux
> > > filesystems, it makes bootloaders and individual EROFS image unpacker
> > > to support/check image integrity and signing easily...
> > > 
> > > It seems the current fs-verity codebase can almost be well-fitted for
> > > this with some minor modification.  If possible, we could go further
> > > in this way.
> 
> More details and background information would be really appreciated here.  I
> thought that EROFS is a simple block-device based filesystem.  It sounds like
> that's fundamentally changed.  How does it work now?

Thanks for your reply!

First, EROFS is still a block-based filesystem, which means the basic I/O unit
is still a block.  However, EROFS's backing data can currently be either from

 a) block device;

 b) cachefiles with blobs which is localed on a backing filesystem;

Since Linux 5.16, EROFS has a multiple-device feature, which means it
can be mounted with a primary device (with file metadata) and many
secondary shared devices (with data).   Such shared devices can be
worked as shared files if the backend is cachefiles since 5.19.

Each EROFS file can refer to data from such share devices (or files)
with Chunk-based files. More details are shown in EROFS documentation
Chunk-based files [1] and my talk on Open Source Europe 2022 [2] in
September for the whole stuff.

[1] https://docs.kernel.org/filesystems/erofs.html
[2] https://static.sched.com/hosted_files/osseu2022/59/Introduction%20to%20Nydus%20Image%20Service%20on%20In-kernel%20EROFS.pdf

> 
> Part of the issue is that crazy proposals involving fsverity are a dime a dozen;
> recent examples are
> https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211112124411.1948809-6-roberto.sassu@huawei.com
> https://lore.kernel.org/r/D3AF9D1E-12E1-434F-AEA4-5892E8BC66AB@gmail.com and
> https://lore.kernel.org/r/cover.1669631086.git.alexl@redhat.com.
> It's hard to know which ones to pay attention to, and they tend to just go away
> on their own anyway.
> 
> You haven't provided enough details for me to properly understand your proposal,
> but to me it sounds similar to the Composefs proposal
> (https://lore.kernel.org/r/cover.1669631086.git.alexl@redhat.com).  That

Yes, I think upstream EROFS now is quite similar to Composefs.  If you think each 
EROFS device as an external blob that needs to be verified with a markle tree.
I think Composefs makes no difference to upstream EROFS now.

> proposal made some amount of sense, and it came with documentation and code.
> IIUC, in Composefs (a) all filesystem metadata is trusted and provided at mount
> time, and (b) all file contents are untrusted and are retrieved from external
> backing files.  So to authenticate a file's contents, the filesystem metadata
> just needs to include a cryptographic hash of that file's contents, and the
> filesystem just needs to compare the actual hash to that expected hash.  Of

My proposal here is to add fsverity markle tree for each EROFS device,
since its data is already deduplicated so we don't need to care about
deduplication.

In the primary device, we add fsverity digests to each other devices
(recorded in the device table), so that each other device markle tree
root hash can be verified.  And the primary device digest can be passed
by mount option or other ways (for example signing.)

> course, one way to implement that is to use fsverity file digests and to enforce
> that the backing file has fsverity enabled with the correct digest.
> 
> It sounds like what you are proposing in EROFS is similar, but differs in that
> you want block-level data deduplication as well.  That presumably means that
> EROFS will represent file contents as a list of deduplicated data blocks, each
> of which is fairly small and not randomly accessible.
> 
> In that case a Merkle tree over each block would not make sense.  There should
> just be a standard cryptographic hash for each block.

Nope, see my reply above...  We don't need to verify each EROFS file
with markle tree but to verify each EROFS device (or blobs) with markle
tree.

> 
> So I don't see how fsverity would be relevant at all.
> 
> Does that sound right to you?

Hopefully I explained enough...

> 
> > > - Encryption
> > > 
> > > I also have some rough preliminary thought for EROFS encryption.
> > > (Although that is not quite in details as verification.)  Currently we
> > > have full-disk encryption and file-based encryption, However, in order
> > > to do finer data sharing between encrypted data (it seems hard to do
> > > finer data de-duplication with file-based encryption), we could also
> > > consider modified convergence encryption, especially for image-based
> > > offline data.
> > > 
> > > In order to prevent dictionary attack, the key itself may not directly be
> > > derived from its data hashing, but we could assign some random key
> > > relating to specific data as an encrypted chunk and find a way to share
> > > these keys and data in a trusted domain.
> > > 
> > > The similar thought was also shown in the presentation of AWS Lambda
> > > sparse filesystem, although they don't show much internal details:
> > > https://youtu.be/FTwsMYXWGB0
> > > 
> > > Anyway, for encryption, it's just a preliminary thought but we're happy
> > > to have a better encryption solution for data sharing for confidential
> > > container images... 
> 
> How would this compare to the old-school approach (commonly used by backup
> software) of just encrypting the deduplicated data blocks with the user's key?

Since currently each EROFS container image consist of
a) one device for metadata
b) several shared devices for data

We'd like to share b) as much as possible, so we need to derive
separated keys for b) instead of encrypting the whole image a) and b)
with a single key.

In that way, data cannot be shared between different images...

> That leaks information about the plaintext, but it's usually considered an

If the key is not directly derived from its key hashing, I assume it
will not leak information?

Thanks,
Gao Xiang

> acceptable tradeoff.
> 
> - Eric