<html><body><p><tt>Timothy Pearson <tpearson@raptorengineering.com> wrote on 08/02/2016 10:20:55 PM:<br><br>> From: Timothy Pearson <tpearson@raptorengineering.com></tt><br><tt>> To: Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com></tt><br><tt>> Cc: sam.mj@au1.ibm.com, petitboot@lists.ozlabs.org, George Wilson/<br>> Austin/IBM@IBMUS, Dave Heller <hellerda@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, <br>> ltcgcw@linux.vnet.ibm.com</tt><br><tt>> Date: 08/02/2016 10:21 PM</tt><br><tt>> Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] Add support for GPG signature enforcement on booted</tt><br><tt>> <br>> On 08/02/2016 09:32 AM, Nayna wrote:<br>> > Hi,<br>> > <br>> > Yes, Thanks Sam for bringing it up.<br>> > And it is good to know people's interest in secure boot.<br>> > <br>> > My work currently covers more of particular aspect of trusted boot at<br>> > petitboot level.<br>> <br>> I need to be extremely clear that we are *only* interested in secure /<br>> trusted boot *iff* we retain full, absolute control of the root of trust<br>> on each machine. We have no way to use e.g. Intel's "boot guard" system<br>> where Intel retains control of the root of trust at all times, and in<br>> fact we have specifically avoided all such hardware due to the severe<br>> security concerns associated with these centralised security models.</tt><br><br><tt>Hi Timothy,</tt><br><br><tt>Thanks for this feedback! It will help us maintain our position, which</tt><br><tt>I hope you'll find congenial.</tt><br><br><tt>I can't speak for IBM or manufacturer polices. However, our team's</tt><br><tt>intent from an overall OpenPOWER perspective is to permit owners to sign</tt><br><tt>their own firmware with their own keys. Further, we intend for owners to</tt><br><tt>be able to sign their own host/NV kernels. We plan to make the full code</tt><br><tt>for the secure boot and trusted boot features available via the OpenPOWER</tt><br><tt>github project. How individual manufacturers choose to apply OpenPOWER</tt><br><tt>designs is outside of our control. However, our approach will be</tt><br><tt>completely open by default with no manufacturer interaction required by</tt><br><tt>end users to sign their own bits. I hope that OpenPOWER partners will</tt><br><tt>see the wisdom of letting customers control their own machines. Others</tt><br><tt>in the broader IBM Linux Technology Center team are fully supportive of</tt><br><tt>(and even demanding) this stance. So I think we're in violent agreement</tt><br><tt>with you.</tt><br><br><tt>Regards,</tt><br><tt>George</tt><br><tt><br>> <br>> From what I understand of OpenPOWER, implementing a fully secure boot<br>> process should be achievable by allowing the owner key to be stored on<br>> the CPU using special hardware (e.g. changing a switch on the mainboard<br>> while the machine is powered off to enable key storage mode).<br>> Furthermore, key update must be achievable by a method that does NOT<br>> require vendor intervention, signing, or provide any ability for the<br>> vendor to re-issue a different root of trust for that particular machine<br>> through a back-door mechanism -- this immediately rules out schemes<br>> where a customer intermediate key is signed by the vendor under license.<br>> <br>> Let's make sure we keep OpenPOWER open, while still allowing the machine<br>> owner to achieve a signed, secure, exclusive boot of software<br>> pre-authorised by that owner.<br>> <br>> Thanks!<br>> <br>> -- <br>> Timothy Pearson<br>> Raptor Engineering<br>> +1 (415) 727-8645 (direct line)<br>> +1 (512) 690-0200 (switchboard)<br>> <a href="https://www.raptorengineering.com">https://www.raptorengineering.com</a><br>> <br></tt><br><tt>-- </tt><br><tt>George Wilson</tt><br><tt>IBM Linux Technology Center</tt><br><tt>Security Architect / Security Team Lead</tt><br><tt>512-286-9271</tt><BR>
</body></html>